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Mainly by offering a detailed criticism of distilled versions of the two main lines of 
argument for (ontological) physicalism, the causal-closure-line and the functionalist 
line, this paper aims to show that the rational support for physicalism (or materialism) 
is less strong than it is usually taken to be by its many adherents. In fact, physicalism 
is a metaphysical position, far exceeding what is vouched for by empirical science. 
Physicalism, therefore, does not have a greater rational claim on our credence than 
any other metaphysical position, for example, dualism (which position is given some 
argumentative support in the paper). Defending the view of – at least – metaphysical 
equality between dualism and physicalism also involves restating correctly and clearly 
what is often left unclear, or is explicated in a misleading way: what it is that 
physicalism and dualism basically amount to as ontological theses. 
 
 
1 The purpose and the basis of this paper 
 
By practically all of its proponents physicalism (or materialism; both terms are 
treated as synonyms in this paper) is held to be the one and only rationally 
defensible world view. I shall argue that this position is less motivated by good 
reasons than by the self-assurance of those who believe that they are on the 
winning team. In doing so, I will concentrate on the consideration of 
physicalism in the context of the philosophy of mind. In fact, the context of the 
philosophy of mind alone is the context to which I will be referring. Thus 
everything I say should be tacitly relativized to that context. 
My first thesis, then, is this: 
 
Thesis 1: A comprehensive doctrine is called “physicalism” in the 
proper sense of the word only if it entails that all mental entities (i.e., 
substances, properties, events, states, objects, etc.) are physical. 
 
The justification for Thesis 1 is easily given. Suppose a comprehensive 
doctrine is called “physicalism” in spite of the fact that it does not entail that all 
mental entities are physical. Hence this doctrine is compatible with 
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(psychophysical) dualism, according to which at least some mental entities are 
not physical. But a comprehensive doctrine that is compatible with dualism can 
certainly not be called “physicalism” in the proper sense of the word. 
 Though rather obvious, Thesis 1 does not appear to have been much 
heeded in recent times. Many philosophers have believed that all that 
physicalism, as a comprehensive doctrine, need amount to is the supervenience 
of the mental on the physical. Supervenience physicalism is often maintained 
to be a more plausible form of physicalism than any doctrine that is called 
“physicalism” in accordance with Thesis 1, according to which thesis 
physicalism, properly so-called, minimally amounts to what might be called the 
General Identity Theory: the doctrine that everything mental is identical with 
something physical. The question necessary to ask here is the following: Does 
the supervenience of the mental on the physical entail that all mental entities 
are physical? If no, then this position is compatible with dualism, and therefore 
a comprehensive doctrine of physicalism, properly so called, cannot be 
identified with it. The inevitability of this conclusion is frequently masked (to 
authors and readers alike) by claiming that supervenience materialism does 
entail that the mental is in a sufficiently strong sense nothing over and above 
the physical. But the main, the central question in the confrontation between 
dualism and materialism must surely be whether or not the mental is, at least in 
some instances, something else than the physical, not whether or not it is 
something over and above the physical, whatever this phrase may mean 
precisely if it is supposed to have a meaning that is different from the meaning 
of something else than the physical.1  (If in some instances the mental proves to 
be something else than the physical, if, in other words, it turns out that some 
mental entities are not physical, then how could it be denied that dualism is 
true – even if the mental were, in some sense, nothing over and above the 
physical?) 
If, on the contrary, the answer to the above question is yes, then why 
consider supervenience physicalism to be a more plausible form of physicalism 
than the General Identity Theory, which many consider to be implausible? 
Moreover, if supervenience materialism is supposed to be a more plausible 
form of materialism because it’s “non-reductive,”2 then, given the answer yes 
to the above question, one may well ask: what can be non-reductive, in an 
ontologically important sense (I am not talking here about linguistic or 
                                                 
1 Presumably the idea is this: something might be something else than the physical without 
being separable from the physical, i.e., without being something over and above the physical. 
Yet, being different does seem to entail being separable (and vice versa), where “-able” 
expresses the appropriate notion of possibility: possible in the widest (objective) sense.  
2 The supervenience materialism of David Lewis, in contrast, is intended to be reductive; see 
Lewis (1994). Lewis notes (ibid., p. 414): “Yet thousands say that what’s good about stating 
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explanatory or any other non-ontological form of non-reductionism), about a 
materialism that entails that every mental entity is physical? It seems to me 
that, given the answer yes to the above question, this so-called non-reductive 
materialism must be in a straightforward sense reductive – for the following 
reason: if all mental entities are physical to begin with, then, trivially, they all 
are reducible to something physical. 
 It should be noted that even if the As supervene on the Bs in a very 
strong way, this does not ipso facto entail that the As are Bs, or that the As are 
somehow reducible to the Bs (which, when the process of reduction is over, 
would make them all Bs after all). Consider the following example. Lateral 
triangularities are the properties such that each of them is nameable in the 
following manner: being a triangle with sides of the lengths a, b, and c. 
Angular triangularities are the properties such that each of them is nameable in 
the following manner: being a triangle with angles of the sizes c, d, and e. The 
angular triangularities supervene on the lateral triangularities in the 
subsequently described, very strong way (employing a concept of 
supervenience that, in the given context, is logically equivalent to a standardly 
used concept; cf. Kim (2001), p. 9, and Kim (1993), p. 65): 
 
For every angular triangularity f, it is conceptually necessary for every 
x: if x exemplifies f, then there is a lateral triangularity g such that x 
exemplifies g and such that it is conceptually necessary for all y: if y 
exemplifies g, then y exemplifies f. 
  
Although the above assertion is conceptually true (and hence the operator of 
conceptual necessity can be prefixed to the assertion without changing the 
asserted content), it does not follow that the angular triangularities are lateral 
triangularities, or that the angular triangularities are somehow reducible to the 
lateral triangularities. On the contrary, with conceptual necessity, no angular 
triangularity is a lateral triangularity, because, with conceptual necessity, no 
angular triangularity has the same extension as any lateral triangularity. It is 
true that there is a one-to-one correspondence between angular triangularities 
and certain superdenumerably infinite sets of lateral triangularities. But one 
should resist the reduction of angular triangularities even to those sets, since 
angular triangularities are straightforward objects of cognition, while those sets 
certainly are not. 
 I need not dwell on the fact that the relationship that has, to date, been 
established to obtain between mental properties and physical properties comes 
in no way close to the relationship that obtains between the angular and the 
lateral triangularities. But even if that very relationship had been established to 
obtain also between the mental and the physical properties, that is, even if we 
had as a conceptual truth 
 
PHYSICALISM, DUALISM, AND INTELLECTUAL HONESTY 
 
Dualism Review, 1, 2005, pp.1-20 
 
4 
For every mental property f, it is conceptually necessary for every x: if x 
exemplifies f, then there is a physical property g such that x exemplifies 
g and such that it is conceptually necessary for all y: if y exemplifies g, 
then y exemplifies f, 
 
it would not follow that mental properties are physical, or that mental properties 
are somehow reducible to physical ones. On the contrary, it could very well be 
true that not only some, but all mental properties are not physical. (To show 
this was the point of the above example.) 
Eliminative materialists aside (who escape despair by trivializing 
physicalism: by denying the existence of mental entities3), I suspect that many 
of those who call themselves “physicalists” are quite aware that the prospects 
of the so-called identity theories (be they token- or type-identity theories) and 
of (ontological) psychophysical reductionism (which ultimately – namely, after 
the allegedly successful reductions – amounts to the very same thing as the 
identity theories) are very dim indeed,4 and they have changed their claims 
accordingly. Nevertheless, they still uphold the names “physicalism” and 
“materialism” for designating their miscellaneous positions, and still despise 
“dualism,” which they keep associating with religious obscurantism, alleging, 
with great emphasis, its anti-scientific nature.5 They still treat “dualism” with a 
curious mixture of contempt and fear, never considering what it truly amounts 
to, as if it were not worthy of the attention of a rational person and, at the same 
time, something so terrible one had better not look at it, like the head of a 
Gorgon. All of this “enlightened” behaviour is merely good for one thing: to 
mask the fact that they who display it are no longer asserting anything that is in 
logical opposition to dualism, which is purely and simply the sober doctrine 
that there is a non-physical side to the mental, or more precisely: that some 
mental entities are not physical.6 I would like to suggest that the time is ripe to 
return to intellectual honesty. 
                                                 
3 According to predicate logic, “every M is ϕ” is trivially true if there are no Ms. 
4 At the end of this paper I hope to have shown them to be even dimmer; see Sections 4 and 5. 
5 For some documentation of this murkily ideological side of some physicalistically oriented 
thinkers, see Meixner (2004). 
6 There are stronger forms of dualism, of course. For example, the doctrine that not only some 
but all mental events are not physical, or the doctrine that subjects of experience are non-
physical and can exist without a body, or even without anything physical existing. But there is 
no good reason to reserve the word “dualism” only for these logically stronger doctrines. 
Already minimal dualism – the doctrine that some mental entities are not physical – is dualism 
in the proper sense of the word, since already minimal dualism (if taken together with the 
obviously true claim that there are physical entities) maintains that there are two (nonempty) 
sides of (non-abstract) being: the physical and the non-physical, and that the mental is at least 
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It is easier to feel gratuitously offended at this than to escape the basic 
point I am making. Put in the most straightforward and non-polemical way I 
can think of, my basic point is this: Let anyone who believes that she is a 
physicalist and in opposition to dualism ask herself whether she believes that 
everything mental is physical. If the answer is “Yes,” then she is a physicalist 
all right (hence no need to feel offended by my call for intellectual honesty!), 
but also an adherent of the frequently disavowed General Identity Theory 
(since “everything mental is physical” is logically equivalent with “everything 
mental is identical with something physical”). If however the answer is “No” – 
“No, I do not believe that everything mental is physical” –, then I indeed 
suggest that she is seriously deluding herself and others by calling herself a 
“physicalist.” 
Fittingly, my second thesis, complementing the first, is this: 
 
Thesis 2: If we use the word “physicalism” in the context of the 
philosophy of mind for a comprehensive philosophical doctrine, then 
we should use that word in its proper sense. 
 
Why should we do that? Suppose in a philosophical discussion somebody 
upholds a comprehensive philosophical doctrine she calls “physicalism,” and 
after a while it turns out that her physicalism is compatible with dualism, 
because it does not entail that all mental entities are physical. Is this a desirable 
situation? I should think not. In a philosophical discussion, we should not make 
it seem – not even prima facie – that we are claiming more than we really mean 
to claim, and of course we should also not make it seem that we are claiming 
less. For fulfilling this requirement, it is mandatory that we use our words in 
their proper senses (provided, of course, they have such). 
 In this paper, I shall use the word “physicalism” in its proper sense to 
designate a comprehensive philosophical doctrine. Hence (according to 
Thesis 1) physicalism entails that all mental entities are physical. In other 
words, any doctrine that does not entail that all mental entities are physical is 
not physicalism (in the proper sense of the word). 
 My third, and central, thesis is this: 
 
Thesis 3: Neither philosophical nor empirical considerations, nor their 
combination, suffice to render it probable, or even plausible, that all 
mental entities are physical. 
 
For showing that Thesis 3 is very likely true, we must, among other things, take 
a careful look at the best arguments that have been advanced in favour of the 
thesis that all mental entities are physical. But, actually, there do not seem to 
be any proposed arguments that are intended to show, in one fell swoop, that 
all mental entities are physical. There are, however, proposed arguments that 
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are intended to show that all mental events are physical (they are arguments for 
the so-called token-identity theory), or that all mental properties are physical 
(they are arguments for the so-called type-identity theory). I will restrict my 
attention to the physicalistic arguments referring to events, where I take events 
to include processes (events involving change) and states (events not involving 
change, but consisting only in a stable situation). 
I claim that there have not been proposed any better arguments for the 
thesis that all mental events are physical – in contrast to propaganda, by which 
I mean the mere disparagement of dualism (as “unacceptable,” “incoherent,” 
“irrational,” “illusory,” “motivated by religious prejudice,” “anti-scientific,” 
“intellectually unclean,” etc.) – than the two arguments that I am going to 
present below. This is, of course, a rather courageous assertion. Many readers 
will disagree with it – and it makes it very easy for them to disagree with it. 
They merely need to cite what they think is, or just might be, a better argument 
for the thesis that all mental events are physical (for example: “What about 
Davidson’s argument in ‘Mental Events’?”) – and, sure enough, I have not 
even mentioned that argument, let alone shown, in all due detail, that it is not 
really better than the two to be presented below! I trust that readers such as 
these will nevertheless find something valuable in this paper, perhaps a reason 
for being slightly doubtful about the truth of physicalism, or a reason for 
thinking that Thesis 3 just might be true. Independently of what readers may 
say, I certainly have to admit that, for all I know, there may have been – or 
perhaps will be – arguments proposed that are better than those that I am going 
to present. While I cannot exclude these possibilities (even if I wrote a book of 
500 pages instead of a short paper), I adopt the attitude of wait and see. Let’s 
wait and see whether anybody has come up, or will come up, with a better 
argument than those presented below. But there are two requirements: (1) it 
must be an argument for the conclusion that all mental events are physical, or 
for a conclusion logically stronger than that, and not for a thesis whose sole 
claim to being physicalism regarding (at least) mental events is that someone or 
other labelled it that way; (2) it must be an argument (with clear premises, a 
clear conclusion, and a valid logical nexus). For the time being I hold: if the 
following two arguments for the less general assertion – the assertion that all 
mental events are physical – are not successful, then it does not seem likely 
that any argument for the completely general assertion – namely, the assertion 
that all mental entities are physical – will be successful. This is a serious 
situation for physicalists, considering that the dualistic opposition seems to be 
indeed better off, both regarding arguments and direct empirical support 
(concerning this important point, see Sections 4 and 5). But here come the 
arguments: 
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P11: Every mental event has a physical effect. 
P12: Everything that has a physical effect is physical. 
C1: Every mental event is physical. 
 
This is (the distilled form of) the argument for physicalism regarding events 
that is most frequently advanced. Great minds do not disdain it (see, for 
example, Dennett (1991), p. 35, where it is clearly visible). The argument is so 
popular that more or less corrupted versions of it have found their way into 
German textbooks on the (Anglo-American) philosophy of mind (see Bieri 
(1981), p. 5, and Beckermann (1999), pp. 115-117). 
 
The Argument from the Identity of the Functionally Equivalent 
 
P21: For every mental event there is a physical event that is functionally 
equivalent with it. 
P22: Functionally equivalent events are identical. 
C2: Every mental event is a physical event. 
 
Though Donald Davidson was not a functionalist, this functionalist argument 
for physicalism regarding events is basically due to him (see Davidson (1980), 
p. 179), as will become entirely clear when the concept of functional 
equivalence is explicated in Section 3 as causal equivalence. It has won far less 
explicit adherents than the Argument from the Causal Closure of the Physical 
World – a somewhat surprising fact, considering that it is impossible for a 
physicalist to deny P21 (as we shall soon see). But the Argument from the 
Identity of the Functionally Equivalent must be implicitly relied on by any 
functionalist who also wants to be a materialist (and practically all 
functionalists want to be materialists). In fact, it is closely related to an 
influential argument “for the Identity Theory” stated long ago by David Lewis 
(see Lewis (1966), and Lewis (1972)) and, independently, by David Armstrong 
(see Armstrong (1968)). In Lewis (1994), p. 418, that argument is restated in 
the following compendious way: 
 
 mental state M = the occupant of the M-role, 
 physical state P = the occupant of the M-role (by science), 
 therefore M = P. 
 
By unpacking the definite description (“the occupant of the M-role”), this 
becomes: 
 
 mental state M is an occupant of the M-role, 
 physical state P is an occupant of the M-role, 
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 the M-role has at most one occupant, 
therefore M = P. 
 
Since this is intended to be a general argument, there are two implicit 
assumptions operative in it: (1) that every mental state, M, shares its functional 
role – the M-role – with some physical state, P – which (if states and events are 
counted the same) is just a different way of saying what is asserted by P21; (2) 
that at most one state occupies a functional role – for example, the M-role –, or 
in other words: that states which occupy the same functional role are identical 
– which (if states and events are counted the same) is just a different way of 
saying what is asserted by P22. 
 
 
2 Critical comment on the Argument from the Causal Closure of the 
Physical World 
 
As I mentioned, this argument is the one that is most frequently advanced by 
advocates of physicalism; it is trusted to an extent that would justify for it the 
name of “rock of physicalism.” Its conclusion does, of course, follow logically 
from its two premises. But neither one of its two premises is such that a denial 
of it would be irrational, or at least contrary to the “spirit of science.” 
If by “events” we mean actual events: events that really happen – and I 
stipulate that, within this paper, we stick to this meaning –, then P11 seems 
highly plausible, but not more than that. It is not inherently irrational to 
suppose (as those special dualists, the epiphenomenalists, do suppose) that 
some mental event has no physical effect. But, on the other hand, P11 has 
certainly not been refuted by anyone; in particular, no counterexample to it has 
ever been presented (nor is it likely that there ever will be). I myself 
sympathize with P11. But it should be noted that it cannot be justified by the 
frequently invoked (and time-honoured) principle that only what has an effect 
exists: esse est efficere. Suppose this is true. Nevertheless, the principle leaves 
the nature of the effect quite unspecified, and hence it supports P11 to no 
greater degree than it supports the hypothesis that every physical event has a 
mental effect – and that degree cannot be very high. 
P12 – the hub of the argument – is the Strong Principle of the Causal 
Closure of the Physical World. One should distinguish it carefully from the 
Weak Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World: 
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Obviously, the Strong Principle logically implies the Weak Principle. Equally 
obviously, the Weak Principle cannot be put in the place of the Strong 
Principle in the Argument from the Causal Closure of the Physical World. For 
then the conclusion of this argument will no longer be a logical consequence of 
its premises; in order to still get the desired conclusion (that all mental events 
are physical), one must add an extra premise, for example: every effect of 
something is the effect of only one thing, forbidding causal over-determination 
(cf. Kim (1989)). The addition of this premise, although together with the other 
two premises it does guarantee the desired conclusion, does not help to 
strengthen the argument: because it states an additional assumption which is 
certainly not of the undeniable kind.7 
 The Principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical World is 
notoriously held by physicalists to be a principle physics cannot do without. 
Sometimes this principle is even held to be entailed by physics. But the first 
question to ask is this: which closure principle do physicalists have in mind? Is 
it the Strong Principle or is it the Weak Principle? Suppose it is the Weak 
Principle. Then we must ask: is it true that physics cannot do without the 
assumption that everything physical that is the effect of something is also the 
effect of something physical? Would physics – as we know it today, or as it 
will be at some future point in time – break down if it turned out that 
something physical is the effect of something, but not the effect of anything 
physical? 
 If physics is supposed to stick to the physical (as seems right), then the 
envisaged violation of the Weak Principle – which is ipso facto also a violation 
of the Strong Principle – would imply that not all the causes of the physical fall 
within the purview of physics. But if it were so, would this be the downfall of 
physics? I suppose not. The only ambition regarding causal knowledge that is 
inherent in physics, qua science of the physical, is the ambition to find the 
physical causes of the physical – to the extent that the physical has physical 
causes (and it is not for physics to prejudge that extent in any way). Thus, if 
some causes of the physical turned out to be non-physical, then the ambition 
regarding causal knowledge that is inherent in physics would not be frustrated. 
The only thing that would be frustrated is a metaphysical bias. 
 It seems that physics can very well do without the Weak Principle of 
Causal Closure, and therefore (as a logical consequence) it can also very well 
do without the Strong Principle. Therefore: the authority of physics cannot be 
invoked in support of premise P12 of the Argument from the Causal Closure of 
                                                 
7 If motivated by ontological considerations only, then the exclusion of causal over-
determination seems arbitrary: there is no good purely ontological reason against causal over-
determination. If, on the other hand, the exclusion is motivated by epistemic interests (as it 
generally is) – mainly, by the interest in obtaining parsimonious explanations –, then one may 
well ask what epistemic interests can do for ontology. There may be a connection between the 
two, but it is certainly not obvious or unproblematic. 
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the Physical World. The assumption of P12 is not a mandate of physics. Nor is 
it a mandate of scientific rationality. There is nothing inherently unscientific in 
the very idea that some causes of the physical are not physical. After all, the 
non-physical causes of the physical might very well be amenable to scientific 
inquiry (though not to the inquiry of physics properly speaking). Thus, it 
appears to be, purely and simply, a matter of metaphysical faith whether one 
believes in P12; but if it is a matter of metaphysical faith, then it cannot be 
deemed irrational to believe otherwise. 
It is sometimes held that there is a direct argument from the doctrinal 
body of physics to P12. The law of the conservation of energy is invoked as the 
basis for P12 by asserting that if something non-physical had a physical effect, 
then that law would be violated. How so? The idea is this: the non-physical 
causation of a physical effect would have to lead to an increase in the amount 
of (physical) energy that is present in the physical world, and such an increase 
would contradict the law of the conservation of energy. 
But, first, this law could only be contradicted by the non-physical 
causation of a physical effect if the physical world were a closed system; for 
what the law says is that in any closed system – that is: in any system where 
there is neither an influx of energy from what is outside the system, nor an 
outflux of energy into what is outside the system – the total amount of energy 
neither increases nor decreases. Clearly, the assertion that the physical world is 
a closed system is not a part of the law of the conservation of energy; nor is it 
even an assertion of physics qua physics, or of natural science qua natural 
science; and, certainly, it is not an assertion that is obviously true or, if not 
obviously true, an assertion that has been shown to be true. No, the assertion 
that the physical world is a closed system is, to all appearances, a metaphysical 
assertion. If this is what it is, then believing in this assertion cannot be declared 
to be a mandate of rationality, let alone of scientific rationality. 
And, second, even if the physical world were a closed system, the law 
of the conservation of energy would only be contradicted by the non-physical 
causation of a physical effect if the occurrence of such causation led indeed to 
a change in the total amount of energy that is present in the physical world. But 
that it would do so is far from obvious. Physics today is ready to countenance 
physical events that are events of absolute chance, i.e., events without a 
(sufficient) cause. The existence of such events does not violate the law of the 
conservation of energy. Nor would this law be violated, I take it, if some of the 
physical events that are supposed to be events of absolute chance were located 
in a brain and, in fact, not chance events but caused by something that is not 
physical (though still having no physical cause). 
But is not P12 simply an empirically well-confirmed hypothesis? Is it 
not true that so far everything observed to have a physical effect has turned out 
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physicalist. Physicalists and interactionist dualists agree that some mental 
events have been observed to have physical effects (to the extent that one can 
observe causation: the having of effects); and the dualists cold-bloodedly add 
that at least some of these mental events have been observed to be not physical 
(not physical being precisely the character under which those events appear to 
them and to everyone else – at least if one is not already totally subservient to 
physicalistic prejudice). Thus, for (normal) dualists, P12 is not empirically 
well-confirmed but, on the contrary, empirically refuted. 
P12 is not simply an inductively well-confirmed hypothesis. And we 
have seen that P12 cannot be deduced from the doctrinal body of physics; nor 
can it be deduced from the doctrinal body of natural science as a whole. 
Moreover, P12, as we have also seen, can neither be justified by the 
methodological interests of physics nor by the methodological interests of 
natural science as a whole. P12 is just a tenet of a particular metaphysical 
creed: the creed of physicalism. The question-begging nature of the Argument 
from the Causal Closure of the Physical World stands now revealed. 
 
 
3 Critical comment on the Argument from the Identity of the 
Functionally Equivalent 
 
Prima facie P21 might be regarded as being empirically well-confirmed, until 
one notices, subsequent to conceptual analysis, that it is rather doubtful 
whether one could ever come up with an instance of empirical confirmation for 
it – in contrast to P11, for which instances of empirical confirmation are easily 
found if one manages to turn the concept of causation into a verifiable 
empirical concept (which is not easily done; but I will let this pass). P21 has the 
following logical form: 
 
 ∀x(Ψ(x) ⊃ ∃y(Φ(y) ∧ R(y, x))). 
 
This makes it seem as if P21 were easily confirmable (just like P11). But the 
predicate “y is functionally equivalent with x,” which stands in the place of 
“R(y, x),” is a defined predicate, its definition, for events x and y, being the 
following: 
 
y is functionally equivalent with x =Def (1) every cause of x is a cause of 
y, and (2) every cause of y is a cause of x, and (3) every effect of x is an 
effect of y, and (4) every effect of y is an effect of x. 
 
In other words, events are functionally equivalent if, and only if, they have the 
same causes and the same effects. The having of the same causes and the same 
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effects, however, amounts to the truth of four logically unrestricted universal 
statements (see the above definition). Thus, the presenting of even a single 
confirmatory instance of P21 requires the prior verification of four logically 
unrestricted all-statements. And thus, the prospects of confirming P21 are, from 
the logical point of view, dim indeed. 
But perhaps the set of causes and effects any event has is de facto – 
though not for logical reasons – finite. The implicit assumption that it is finite – 
perhaps consisting of only two elements: the (immediate total) cause and the 
(immediate total) effect of the event – may help to account for the cheerfulness 
with which most people (even those who are not physicalists, even a substance 
dualist like me: see Meixner (2004)) accept P21 as something science has 
shown us to be true, or is at least about to show us to be true. But science is 
still very far away from showing the truth of P21, and in fact there is some 
reason to be pessimistic about it ever doing so. 
I suspect, however, that, for physicalists, there is a much more sinister 
implicit assumption at work here than the one just mentioned: they are positive 
that for every mental event there is a physical event that is functionally 
equivalent with it because they implicitly assume that every mental event is 
identical with some physical event (identity entailing functional equivalence, 
of course). If this is the situation, then the Argument from the Identity of the 
Functionally Equivalent is rendered question-begging. Whatever support P21 
may have, given the conclusion of the above argument of which it is the first 
premise, P21 cannot be taken to be supported by the assumption that every 
mental event is identical with some physical event. 
Unlike P11, P21 cannot be denied by a physicalist, not even in principle. 
A physicalist can without contradicting herself accept mental events that have 
no physical effect; she only needs to pay the price for this and accept physical 
events that have no physical effects (which, of course, is a highly implausible 
assumption, especially considering that the physical events in question would 
be mental events). But a physicalist cannot without contradicting himself 
accept mental events which are such that no physical event is functionally 
equivalent with them; for if she accepted this, it would be logically incumbent 
upon her to also accept that some mental events are not physical, since it can 
only be true that a mental event has no physical event that is functionally 
equivalent with it (not even itself) if it is itself not physical. 
 Thus, P21 is logically entailed by physicalism. This logical fact makes it 
rather difficult for physicalists not to beg the question in the Argument from 
the Identity of the Functionally Equivalent. They are bound to have the illusion 
that P21 is as good as certain. But in fact they are only seeing P21 in the 
favourable light of their favourite metaphysical assumption. It is incumbent 
upon them to adduce support for P21 which is independent of that assumption. 
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notwithstanding, physicalists are, qua physicalists, condemned to believe in the 
truth of P21 and to desperately seek confirmations of it. For in whatever degree 
P21 remains unconfirmed, physicalism, too, must remain unconfirmed, which 
unconfirmedness, if persistent, must be a powerful source of belief-eroding 
doubt – provided, of course, that one is acting rationally.8 
 Concerning P22, it should be noted that it was once suggested by 
Donald Davidson as a criterion of identity for events.9 That P22 is the 
Davidsonian identity-criterion for events becomes immediately apparent if we 
keep in mind the above-presented definition of functional equivalence for 
events. But we are not concerned here with the question whether P22 can 
indeed serve as a criterion of identity for events (which is doubtful), we are 
only concerned with the question whether P22 can be plausibly regarded as 
true. This is all that matters for the evaluation of the Argument from the 
Identity of the Functionally Equivalent. 
 The rationale behind P22 is the assumption that events are purely 
functional entities, that all there is to them is to be nodes in a causal net. 
According to this assumption, an event has no inner being in addition to its 
causal role; aside from its causal role (which can be profitably identified with 
the set of its causes and effects), an event is considered to be nothing at all. 
Thus, P22 is a principle of functionalism. 
 Note that P22 can be falsified (i.e., rendered false) not only by 
functionally equivalent events in a causal net which are, nevertheless, different, 
due to their inner nature, but also by causally isolated events. Causally isolated 
events are events that have no causes and no effects. Hence, trivially, all such 
events are functionally equivalent, and hence, if there happen to be two 
causally isolated events, P22 will be false. 
 But though it can in principle be falsified: rendered false by counter-
instances, as we have just seen, P22 seems to have the great advantage of being 
not falsifiable by us: not knowable as false by our presenting of counter-
instances. (Karl Popper, of course, would have had his doubts about this being 
an advantage.) In order to falsify P22, one has to adduce two different events, a 
and b, that are nevertheless functionally equivalent. But by the very act of 
presenting a and b, veridically and with justification, as different events, it 
seems one is already showing that they are not functionally equivalent. For 
how could a human being, veridically and with justification, present a and b as 
different events if they did not have different effects on this human being? 
                                                 
8 Here, and also for excluding apparent counterexamples to P22 (see below in the main text), 
the temptation for physicalists “to go eliminativist” is great: if there are no mental events, then 
P21 is trivially true – and so is C2. Some physicalists (for example, the Churchlands and Daniel 
Dennett) have succumbed to this temptation. But this move – closing one’s eyes to reality – 
can hardly be considered rational. 
9 See Davidson (1980), p. 179. Significantly, it is pointed out by Davidson that his criterion is 
useful for establishing the identity between a pain and a complex physiological event. 
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But this rhetorical question, demanding the answer “yes,” presents 
something as being obvious which just isn’t obvious at all. I can, veridically 
and with justification, present 1 and 2 as different numbers, although they do 
not have different effects on me (since they do not have any effects on me at 
all). I can distinguish them nonetheless, by cognizing – in an intersubjectively 
accessible way – their inner nature. I can do this because not all cognition rides 
on the back of causation which originates in what is being cognized. What is 
true of the numbers 1 and 2 may also hold true of one of my mental events, a, 
and a physical event, b, which is a functional equivalent of a: though a and b 
have the same causes and the same effects, I may well be able to present them 
as different, doing so veridically and with justification. 
Here is how (and I am merely repeating a story that has, one way or 
other, been often told). Suppose science has advanced to the point that a and b 
are shown to be functional equivalents of each other. (So far, this has not been 
shown for any mental event x and physical event y.) But the mental event a – a 
certain experience of mine, say, my seeing and touching of a red wooden stick, 
put in perfectly clear water, appearing at once bent to my vision and straight to 
my touch – is immediately present to me: in a non-causal way, since I am its 
intrinsic subject, with certain subjective traits and with some illusory 
intentional content. The event b – a neurophysiological occurrence, presumably 
– is not present to me in that way at all: there is nothing intrinsically subjective 
about it.10 Moreover, the illusory intentional content of a – taken at face value: 
in all its richness and vividness – makes it quite impossible to locate a within 
physical reality, be it inside or outside brains. Though functionally (i.e., 
causally) equivalent with a, b simply cannot fill the place of a (entirely). This 
is the way things seem to me (and also to physicalists, I presume, at least prima 
facie). Thus, trusting appearances, I am entirely justified in passing the 
judgment that a and b are, though functional equivalents of each other, 
different events. Physicalists, in turn, not trusting appearances (but they 
certainly must trust some appearances, or there could not be any knowledge for 
them), are justified in pointing out – as they do, as a rule –that I might be 
mistaken (i.e., that one is rationally allowed to take the degree of credence for 
my being mistaken to be greater than 0); after all people often thought that X 
and Y were different, though in fact they were identical. (There are a lot of 
stock examples for that, beloved by physicalists, usually taken from the 
resplendent history of scientific progress.) Indeed, I might be mistaken in 
thinking that a and b are different; but this alone does not take away my being 
                                                 
10 Do I merely think so because I am already a dualist and see the world in the light of my 
metaphysical bias, not realizing that I do so? While I might certainly be moved by motives 
hidden to me, merely uttering a suspicion in this regard does not justify that suspicion – a point 
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justified in asserting that they are different. For taking away my justification in 
this regard, physicalists must show that I am in fact wrong about a and b being 
different (and this is not already done by showing that I might be wrong11). 
Since appearances are on my side, the burden of proof lies with them. But how 
could physicalists show that a and b are not only functional equivalents of each 
other but also identical (without begging the question regarding physicalism)? 
Only by assuming a general principle that sanctions the relevant inference of 
identity from functional equivalence, or in other words: by maintaining P22 in 
the teeth of an apparent counterexample to it. But they certainly do not have 
any more rational right to hold on to P22 than I have to hold on to the apparent 
counterexample to P22. In view of that counterexample, Ockham’s razor – “it’s 
parsimonious to identify functionally equivalent events” – or inference to the 
best explanation – “the best explanation of the functional equivalence of events 
is that they are, in fact, identical” – are problematic procedures and cannot be 
safely relied on. Thus, jumping from functional equivalence to identity remains 
a blind leap of faith – and in the case of the mental event a and the physical 
event b a foolhardy one, I should say.12 
Summing up, my objection to the Argument from the Identity of the 
Functionally Equivalent is this. Either P21 is wrong and for some mental event 
there is no physical event that is functionally equivalent with it – then 
physicalism stands refuted –, or, indeed (though we are still very far away from 
having shown this), P21 is true and for every mental event there is a physical 
event that is functionally equivalent with it. But then my mental event a and 
the physical event b that is its functional equivalent will still appear to be 
different events, and therefore P22 will seem to be “counterexampled.” P22 is 
not an analytic principle; in fact, it has no support which is not of a question-
begging nature: it has no support which is not obviously guided by materialist 
metaphysical bias. Therefore: if P22, in the envisaged situation, is maintained 
in the teeth of the evidence against it, then this move is not more, but certainly 
less reasonable than maintaining, in the envisaged situation, what that evidence 
straightforwardly tells us: that P22 is false. 
 
 
4 Is the opposition no better off? 
 
                                                 
11 Unfortunately, it is not entirely unnecessary to make this parenthetical remark. 
12 Kim writes: “[A] certain instability exists in a situation in which two distinct events are 
claimed to be nomologically equivalent causes or explanations of the same phenomenon; 
stability is restored when equivalence is replaced by identity or some asymmetric relation of 
dependence.” (Kim (1989), p. 246.) I fail to discern the “certain instability” Kim is talking 
about. And even if it existed, it would be an instability in our theorizing. Can we draw 
ontological conclusions from that? I should think, we cannot. 
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I have argued that physicalists, if they offer arguments for their position 
regarding mental events at all, do not have better arguments on offer than the 
two arguments discussed. But perhaps the dualistic opposition is no better off? 
Perhaps the arguments of dualists against physicalism regarding mental events 
are just as bad as the arguments of physicalists for physicalism regarding 
mental events? 
 If one does not want to install dualism instead of physicalism on the 
throne of metaphysics, this objection is strictly irrelevant. But let me make it 
relevant: Descartes, for one, would have liked to see dualism instead of 
physicalism on the throne of metaphysics. In fact, he thought dualism is the 
only position that has any right to be there. So what did he have to offer in 
support of his claim? Here is a variant of the Cartesian argument, trimmed to 
its bare essentials: 
 
P31: There is a mental event for which it is possible that it exist without 
anything physical existing. 
P32: There is no physical event for which it is possible that it exist without 
anything physical existing. 
C3: Some mental event is not physical. 
 
Most people believe that the notion of possibility that is operative in this 
argument is crucial for assessing it. Pick, therefore, the sense of possibility 
according to which almost everybody agrees that P31 is true: interpret 
“possible” to mean as much as “epistemico-logically possible,” that is: possible 
in the broadest sense, given the conceptual framework that fits our current 
knowledge. Employing this sense of “possible,” P31 seems incontrovertibly 
true, and not only to dualists (in sharp contrast to the situation obtaining when 
one interprets “possible” to mean as much as “metaphysically possible”). But 
in interpreting P32 the same interpretation of “possible” must be used as in 
interpreting P31 (or else one commits the fallacy of equivocation). The 
intriguing thing is that P32, with the epistemico-logical interpretation of 
“possible” in place, certainly does not seem to be less true than P31, with that 
same interpretation of “possible” in place. 
 This looks like a desperate situation for physicalists. For the conclusion 
that is unacceptable for them – if it is not unacceptable for them, how can they 
still call themselves “physicalists”? – follows logically from the premises, 
since the logical structure of the argument is an uncontroversially valid 
inference pattern: 
 
P31  ∃x[Ψ(x) ∧ K(x) ∧ ◊(E(x) ∧ ¬∃y(Φ(y) ∧ E(y)))] 
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C3  ∃x[Ψ(x) ∧ K(x) ∧ ¬Φ(x)] 
 
What is to be done now? For physicalists, if they want to hold on to the 
negation of the conclusion, there is no choice but to deny the premises. Perhaps 
they will try to avoid this move by tacitly redefining themselves as physicalists 
in such a way that, qua physicalists, they are not committed to believing that all 
mental events are physical events. But I have argued that redefining 
physicalism in this way amounts to giving up physicalism. 
 We must, therefore, ask: how can physicalists deny the premises P31 
and P32 (as interpreted)? Suppose physicalists single out P31 for being denied. 
But is it at all plausible that, for every mental event, it is epistemico-logically 
impossible that it exist without anything physical existing? It is widely 
accepted that conceivability is sufficient for epistemico-logical possibility. I 
(and I am certainly not alone in this) can conceive of my present mental state 
existing without anything physical existing; hence it is epistemico-logically 
possible that it exist without anything physical existing. 
The prospects of denying P32 appear to be even dimmer. The idea of a 
physical event for which it is epistemico-logically possible that it exist without 
anything physical existing seems preposterous – just as preposterous as the 
idea of a human being (a number, etc.) for which it is epistemico-logically 
possible that it exist without any human being (number, etc.) existing. 
However, it is important to realize that not all statements of the form ¬∃x[Φ(x) 
∧ K(x) ∧ ◊(E(x) ∧ ¬∃y(Φ(y) ∧ E(y)))] are true: “There is a first man on the 
moon who is American and for whom it is epistemico-logically possible that he 
exist without any first man on the moon existing” is certainly a true statement, 
and therefore its negation – which is a statement of the form ¬∃x[Φ(x) ∧ K(x) 
∧ ◊(E(x) ∧ ¬∃y(Φ(y) ∧ E(y)))] – is false. Nevertheless, a statement of the form 
¬∃x[Φ(x) ∧ K(x) ∧ ◊(E(x) ∧ ¬∃y(Φ(y) ∧ E(y)))] will turn out true – provably 
so, no matter how the possibility operator ◊ is interpreted, as long as the 
following utterly elementary inference-pattern of modal logic stays applicable: 
◊A, ¬◊¬B → ◊(A ∧ B) – for every predicate Φ(x) for which one has: ∀x(Φ(x) 
⊃ ¬◊¬Φ(x)). Whatever relevant interpretation of ◊ is chosen, predicates Φ(x) 
for which ∀x(Φ(x) ⊃ ¬◊¬Φ(x)) is true are, for example, “x is a human being,” 
“x is a number,” and – it seems undeniable – “x is physical.” 
Is it in fact undeniable that for everything physical it is not epistemico-
logically possible that it be not physical? This table is physical, and it is 
certainly not, in any sense, possible that it be not physical. This brain is 
physical, and it is not, in any sense, possible that it be not physical. This 
hydrogen atom is physical, and it is certainly not, in any sense, possible that it 
be not physical. And so on. Whatever room is left for denying ∀x(Φ(x) ⊃ 
¬◊¬Φ(x)), with Φ(x) being “x is physical” and ◊ designating epistemico-
logical possibility (it doesn’t seem much room to me), it is all the room 
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physicalists have for escaping the Cartesian argument without appearing utterly 
unreasonable about the matter. 
It is important to fully appreciate this. Otherwise P32 can seem very 
easily deniable – at least for physicalists. For take some mental event, say, an 
experience of pain. Many physicalists will blithely acknowledge that it is 
epistemico-logically possible that this pain-experience exist without anything 
physical existing (thereby accepting P31). But, of course, they will also hold 
that the pain-experience is physical. Hence, they conclude that for some 
physical event – the pain-experience – it is epistemico-logically possible that it 
exist without anything physical existing – contradicting P32. 
Well, nothing easier than to use the negation of the conclusion of a 
logically valid argument to “refute” one of its premises! In fact, the use of this 
dialectical procedure would be impeccable in the present case if the refuted 
premise had no other support than that it serves to establish the desired 
conclusion; if this were so, one would have to judge the argument question-
begging. However, as we have just seen, P32 does have support that is 
independent of the conclusion it serves to establish: it is grounded in modal 
logic and the highly plausible principle that for everything that is physical it is 
epistemico-logically impossible that it be not physical. 
 
 
5 Arguments don’t matter? 
 
The sophisticated physicalist philosopher – I need not provide any names, for 
the sophisticated physicalist philosopher is very common, and becoming more 
common every day – will be utterly unimpressed by all of this: both by my 
criticism of the best arguments for event-physicalism, and by my presentation 
of a strong argument for the negation of event-physicalism. For the 
sophisticated physicalist believes that arguments don’t matter; what matters are 
empirical facts. Moreover, the sophisticated physicalist believes that the 
empirical facts are all in favour of physicalism, and that there are none in 
favour of dualism. 
However, one can make a case for the position that physicalism is 
refuted by empirical fact. As follows. There are illusory experiences: 
experiences real enough as experiences, but with illusory contents (an example 
has been given in Section 3). The existence of illusory experiences is an 
empirical fact, and it seems that they just cannot be fitted into a purely physical 
world, neither from the start: without prior reduction, nor after any conceivable 
reductive process. Illusory experiences seem to be irreducibly non-physical.13 
                                                 
13 For details, see Chapter 4 of Meixner (2004). See also the considerations surrounding the 
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Dennett, for one, is much exercised by this difficulty for physicalism and is led 
to an – implausible – eliminativist position regarding what he calls “real 
seemings.”14 
 Moving on to an objection against sophisticated physicalism that 
specifically addresses its rejection of philosophical argument, one may well 
ask: how could empirical facts all by themselves – without argument, and 
hence without theory – demonstrate anything? Is it that empirical facts, all by 
themselves, somehow create a certain atmosphere in which only one 
Weltanschauung is possible? But this question, I fear, is lost on the 
sophisticated physicalists. Perhaps the following considerations will be more 
effective (although I doubt it). What is revealed by empirical research – in ever 
greater detail and accuracy (but there is no saying whether we will ever reach 
completeness regarding detail and accuracy; there is some indication that one 
has been far too optimistic in this regard) – is the manner in which 
neurophysiological conditions are necessary, respectively sufficient, conditions 
for the occurrence of mental events. But in no way does empirical research 
imply that mental events are nothing else than the neurophysiological events 
that condition them. On the contrary, that mental events are, at least 
provisionally, something else than physical events is a methodological premise 
of brain-consciousness research.15 Suppose, then, that brain-consciousness 
research develops in the best possible way. Would that mean that one reaches, 
purely as a result of empirical research, the insight that all mental events are 
certain physical events? No, all one would reach, purely as the result of 
empirical research, is this: for each mental event, one is able to provide the 
necessary and sufficient physical condition. This is the best possible outcome 
of empirical brain-consciousness research. Everything that goes beyond this is 
metaphysics. I have no objection to metaphysics. On the contrary, I believe that 
it is an absolutely indispensable part of philosophy. But what might be 
expected of philosophers is to be able to distinguish when they are doing 
metaphysics, and when not, and when they are doing metaphysics in a 
philosophically responsible way, and when not. 
 In summing up, I repeat my appeal: it is time to return to intellectual 
honesty in the philosophy of mind. The honest position is to admit that dualism 
is rationally at least on a par with physicalism. This position is compatible with 
being an agnostic regarding these basic metaphysical positions. It is also 
compatible with being a believer in physicalism, respectively dualism. What 
the materialist believers, as a rule, have not realized (or refuse to realize) is that 
they have a certain metaphysical faith: a belief that they accept on other than 
rational or scientific grounds – which situation, it should be noted, does not by 
itself entail that they are not rationally permitted to have this belief. But, 
                                                 
14 See Dennett (1991). 
15 On methodological dualism, see Chapter 7 of Meixner (2004). 
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speaking of scientism instead of materialism (de facto, the difference is 
immaterial), Bas van Fraassen has put very well what would be rationally right 
also for the materialist believer: 
 
Commitment to the scientific enterprise does not require [scientism]. If anyone adopts 
such a belief, he or she does it as a leap of faith. To make such a leap does not make 
us ipso facto irrational; but we should be able to live in the light of day, where our 
decisions are acknowledged and avowed as our own, and not disguised as the 
compulsion of reason. (Van Fraassen (1991), p. 17.) 
 
Uwe Meixner 
Institute of Philosophy, University of the Saarland,  
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